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Attorney-Client Privilege: Expanding the 
Crime-Fraud Exception to Intentional Torts 
STACY KOCHANOWSKI† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine the following attorney-client privilege scenario.1 
Adam Smith is David James’s attorney. David wants to kill 
his wife, Victoria, in order to collect on her life insurance 
policy. David calls Adam to talk about the life insurance 
policy and murder. Adam answers the call and informs David 
that the conversation will be recorded for Adam to recall the 
conversation, if needed, at a later date. David asks about how 
murder affects the payout on a life insurance policy. He then 
asks how often murders go unsolved and the easiest way to 
get away with murder. Adam advises him that the best way 
to get away with murder is to take Victoria out on their boat 
and have her fall over the edge.2 David agrees, and the next 
day he does as advised. As he pushes her over the edge, he 
 
†My sincerest gratitude to the Buffalo Law Review, especially Courtney Way and 
her team, for their hard work in making my comment publishable. A special 
thanks to Prof. Christine Bartholomew, who helped me take a seed of an idea and 
grow it into a comment. Lastly, thank you to my friends and family for listening 
to me talk about this endlessly and contributing the creative process. 
 1. This is a much more straightforward, over-the-top example than what 
would normally happen in practice. The crime-fraud exception can be complicated 
and is usually very difficult to prove.  
 2. It is assumed that if Victoria’s murder goes unsolved, David will be able 
to collect on the policy. 
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yells out to Victoria, “This is what needs to be done. My 
attorney told me how to get rid of you and collect on your life 
insurance policy.” 
Unfortunately for David, Victoria survives and goes to 
the police. Victoria tells the police about everything that 
happened, including David’s statement about his attorney’s 
advice. The police bring in David, who says that his lawyer 
told him that murdering Victoria was the easiest way to get 
to the life insurance policy. David mentions that Adam 
recorded their phone call. David is charged with attempted 
murder. 
After reviewing David and Victoria’s statements, the 
government subpoenas Adam for a deposition and the phone 
call recording. Adam moves to quash the subpoenas, 
claiming attorney-client privilege. The government 
responds, claiming the crime-fraud exception applies. It 
submits evidence of David and Victoria’s statements.3 The 
government requests that the court review the phone call 
recording in camera. The court agrees to review in camera 
because there is a reasonable belief that the recording will 
provide enough evidence to show that the crime-fraud 
exception applies.4After in camera5 review, the court decides 
that the crime-fraud exception applies, based on the 
recording and statements. It denies the motion to quash. The 
government can now compel Adam to testify about the 
conversation with David. 
The previous scenario is what occurs under the crime-
fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege. This paper 
explores the possibility of including intentional torts within 
the exception. Part II discusses the development and history 
 
 3. Note that David’s statement that Adam advised him may be a waiver, 
regardless of the crime-fraud exception. For the purpose of the scenario, it is 
assumed that it does not waive the communication. 
 4. See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 574–75 (1989). 
 5. There is not a set standard that must be met in order to apply the crime-
fraud exception. Courts have struggled with this. PETER NICHOLAS, EVIDENCE 316 
(3d ed. 2014).  
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of the attorney-client privilege. Part III then explains the 
crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege, which 
leads into Part IV, the extension of the crime-fraud exception 
to intentional torts, including its acceptance and rejection by 
federal courts. Part V then concludes with how to implement 
the crime-fraud exception as a firm part of the crime-fraud 
exception to the attorney-client privilege. 
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 
The attorney-client privilege is one of the oldest legal 
privileges.6 Each state has its own controlling statute on the 
attorney-client privilege.7 However, these statutes have a 
general, overarching framework, defined by Wigmore using 
common law.8 According to Wigmore, the attorney-client 
privilege is: 
(1) where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional 
legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communication relating 
to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at 
his insistence permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself 
or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived.9 
Courts use Wigmore’s definition of the attorney-client 
privilege,10 as he is considered the expert on privileges.11 
However, the definition is somewhat ambiguous in 
practice.12 Therefore, common law patches the holes in 
 
 6. Id. at 291. 
 7. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4503 (CONSOL. 2016). 
 8. NICHOLAS, supra note 5, at 291 (citing 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292, at 
554 (McNaughton rev. 1961)).  
 9. Id. 
 10. See, e.g., United States v. Graf, 610 F.3d 1148, 1156 (9th Cir. 2010); 
Cavallaro v. United States, 284 F.3d 236, 245 (1st Cir. 2002); CP Salmon Corp. 
v. Pritzker, 238 F. Supp. 3d 1165, 1171 (D. Alaska 2017). 
 11. See, e.g., United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681, 684 (1st Cir. 
1997). 
 12. See id. (explaining that while the attorney-client privilege is well-
established and a straightforward way to safeguard communications, waiver 
presents a collection of different rules for different problems that are “far from 
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Wigmore’s definition. 
A. History of the Attorney-Client Privilege 
The attorney-client privilege in the United States 
derives from English law.13 In the Sixteenth Century, 
England passed the Statute Against Perjury, requiring 
witness attendance under penalty of a fine.14 From the 
requirement, questions arose regarding witnesses’ fitness to 
testify, especially those who were a party to the case.15 This 
created an incentive for litigants to find out what the other 
party disclosed to his legal advisor, and therefore created the 
attorney-client privilege.16 However, the privilege did not 
become a well-settled common law doctrine, until the 
Nineteenth Century,17 after developments like attributing 
the privilege to the client rather than the representative 
were created.18 
After the American Revolution, the United States 
retained the English attorney-client privilege.19 Prior to 
1820, courts in twenty reported cases, including six state 
courts and two federal circuits, adopted the English 
 
settled.”). 
 13. Attorney-Client Privilege in the United States § 1:1, Westlaw (database 
updated Dec. 2017). 
 14. Id. at § 1:2. But see 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES (stating that 
perjury existed before the Perjury Statute of 1563 and was punishable by death 
at common law). 
 15. Attorney-Client Privilege in the United States, supra note 13, at § 1.1. The 
Statute Against Perjury deemed parties to the case unfit to testify, as the nature 
of the jury trial changed from thinking witnesses were untrustworthy to wanting 
witnesses to introduce the facts to the jury. This reflected a desire to have juries 
rule based on their neighborhood-based, personal knowledge of the facts. If the 
court found an integral witness unfit to testify, it helped the opposing party’s 
case, as there would be a gap in the evidence.  
 16. Id. 
 17. EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: 
EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES § 2.2 (3d ed. 2018).  
 18. See Attorney-Client Privilege in the United States, supra note 13, at § 1.3. 
 19. Id. at § 1:12. 
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attorney-client privilege.20 United States courts’ main 
change to the privilege was removing the English limitation 
of documents or conversations “pending or in anticipation of 
litigation.”21 
Congress affirmed the attorney-client privilege when it 
created the Federal Rules of Evidence.22 After careful review 
of proposed rules from the judiciary, the House passed the 
Federal Rules of Evidence on February 6, 1974.23 In total, 
there are sixty-eight Federal Rules of Evidence, covering the 
topics of: judicial notice, presumptions, relevance, privileges, 
witnesses, opinions, expert testimony, hearsay, 
authentication, identification, and evidence contents.24 
The Judiciary recommended to the House Committee 
nine non-constitutional privileges, encompassing thirteen 
rules.25 However, the House Committee decided to scrap the 
 
 20. Id. (citing Lynde v. Judd, 3 Day 499 (Conn. 1807); Calkin v. Lee, 2 Root  
363 (Conn. 1796); Mills v. Griswold, 1 Root  383 (Conn. 1792); State v. Phelps, 1 
Kirby 282 (Conn. 1787); Bank of Columbia v. French, 2 F. Cas. 631 (No. 867) 
(C.C.D.C. 1804); Murray v. Dowling, 17 F. Cas. 1047 (No. 9,959) (C.C.D.C. 1803); 
Anonymous 8 Mass. 370 (1811); Hoffman v. Smith, 1 Cai. 157 (N.Y. 1803); 
Jackson v. Burtis, 14 Johns. 391 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1817); Yordan v. Hess, 13 Johns. 
Rep. 492 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1816); Baker v. Arnold, 1 Cai. 258 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1803); 
Riggs v. Denniston, 3 Johns. Cas. 198 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1802); Heister v. Davis, 3 
Yeates 4 (Pa. 1800); Morris’ Lessee v. Vanderen, 1 U.S. 64, 1 Dall. 64, 1 L. Ed. 38 
(Pa. 1782); Andrews v. Solomon, 1 F. Cas. 899 (No. 378) (C.C.D. Pa. 1816); Corps 
v. Robinson, 6 F. Cas. 597 (No. 3,252) (C.C.D. Pa. 1809); Holmes v. Comegys, 1 
U.S. 439, 1 Dall. 439, 1 L. Ed. 213 (Pa. C.P. 1789); State v. Squires, 1 Tyl. 147 
(Vt. 1891); Parker v. Carter, 18 Va. (4 Munf.) 273 (1814); Clay v. Williams, 16 Va. 
( 2 Munf.) 105 (1811). These cases focused on legal advisors withholding their 
own or client documents. 
 21. Attorney-Client Privilege in the United States, supra note 13, at § 1:12. 
 22. FED. R. EVID., Historical Note. In 1961, the Judicial Conference of the 
United States designated the Honorable Earl Warren to appoint an advisory 
committee on the usefulness of uniform evidence rules. By March 1969, the 
Judicial Conference Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 
approved the Advisory Committee’s draft of the rules, with edits, and submitted 
the draft to the Supreme Court. Chief Justice Warren Burger, on behalf of the 
Supreme Court, submitted the proposed rules to Congress on February 5, 1973. 
 23. Id. 
 24. See FED. R. EVID.  
 25. Id. The recommended non-constitutional privileges were: “[r]equired 
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nine recommendations for two rules, Federal Rules of 
Evidence 501 and 502.26 Federal Rule of Evidence 501 
encompasses all privileges27 and states that the common law 
governs a claim of privilege, unless there is a different rule 
in the United States Constitution, federal statute, or 
Supreme Court rules.28 However, Rule 501 also states that 
in a civil case, state law governs a claim or defense of 
privilege, if the state law supplies the “rule of decision.”29 
Federal Rule of Evidence 502 discusses the disclosure 
and waiver for attorney-client privilege information.30 It does 
not actually explain the attorney-client privilege; 
explanation is left to the common law.31 
Rule 501’s application varies by court and state. In state 
courts, the state statutes, court rules, and common law apply 
to attorney-client privilege decisions.32 In federal courts, the 
 
reports, lawyer-client, psychotherapist-patient, husband-wife, communications 
to clergymen, political vote, trade secrets, secrets of state and other official 
information, and identity of informer.” 
 26. See FED. R. EVID. 501 advisory committee notes on 1974 enactment. While 
the recommended privileges were not circumscribed in a rule, a few privileges are 
commonly recognized through common law, like the psychotherapist-patient, 
Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996), husband-wife, Trammel v. United States, 
445 U.S. 40 (1980), and communications to clergymen, In re Grand Jury 
Investigation, 918 F.2d 374 (3d Cir. 1990); see also Christine Bartholomew, 
Exorcising the Clergy Privilege, 103 VA. L. REV. 1015, 1020–21 (2017). 
 27. FED. R. EVID. 501. 
 28. Id.  
 29. Id. This means that state privilege law applies in diversity cases, while 
federal privilege law applies in non-diversity cases and in cases where a federal 
court uses state law to fill in gaps in federal law. FED. R. EVID. 501.  
 30. FED. R. EVID. 502.  
 31. See id. Rule 502(a) lays out the waiver requirements for disclosure to a 
federal office or agency; Rule 502(b) explains that an inadvertent disclosure does 
not operate as a waiver if reasonable steps were made to prevent and reverse the 
disclosure; Rule 502(c) discusses state court proceeding disclosures; and Rule 
502(d)–(f) explains the controlling effects of court orders, party agreements, and 
the rule, respectively. Because the crime-fraud exception does not involve Rule 
502’s disclosure and waiver rules, this paper focuses on Rule 501’s broad grant of 
discretion to states to determine their own attorney-client privilege. 
 32. See PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, FED. RULES OF 
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type of case dictates the attorney-client privilege application. 
For cases where the state law supplies the rule of decision in 
a federal civil case,33 state common law attorney-client 
privilege applies.34 For federal civil cases not based on 
diversity, federal attorney-client privilege law applies.35 For 
federal criminal cases, federal common law principles will 
apply.36 
In addition to the Federal Rules, states have their own 
attorney-client privilege statutes. Figure One in the 
Appendix lays out each state’s attorney-client privilege 
statute’s privilege holder distinction, as well as its crime-
fraud exception.37 In Figure One, there are slightly different 
attorney-client privileges between states. However, 
Alabama’s privilege seems to be the most widely accepted, 
with nineteen states adopting it or a similar version.38 The 
 
EVIDENCE RULE 501 (3d ed. 2019), Westlaw (database updated Feb. 2019). 
 33. Where state law provides the rule of decision, diversity jurisdiction 
applies. Id. Diversity jurisdiction is a claim for over $75,000 with citizens from 
different states or countries. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2011). However, diversity 
encompasses more than just state law; it can appear in cases “where a claim or 
defense is based upon federal law.” ROTHSTEIN, supra note 32. In those cases, 
federal privilege law applies. Id. In cases of mixed federal and state law issues, 
courts either favor admissibility or federal law. Id. 
 34. See FED. R. EVID. 501. 
 35. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 32; see also FED. R. EVID. 501. 
 36. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 32.  
 37. The figure provides the pertinent, relevant parts of each attorney-client 
privilege. Important to note, Figure One does not give common law interpretation 
of the state statutes or court rules because each court may interpret and apply 
the law differently. For example, the United States District Court for the Western 
District of New York may interpret New York’s common law attorney-client 
differently than the Eighth Judicial District of New York. The difference may 
occur by looking at different common law precedents, even though each court’s 
interpretation was based on the New York’s attorney-client privilege. 
 38. ALA. R. EVID. 502(b). Alabama’s law is used out of simplicity in reading 
the chart in the appendix—it is not indicative of time or importance. Alabama’s 
privileges states that the client, as the privilege holder, can prevent disclosure of 
confidential communications between: (1) the client/client’s representative and 
the attorney/attorney’s representative, (2) the attorney and the attorney’s 
representative, (3) the client/client’s representative, the attorney/attorney’s 
representative, and an attorney/attorney’s representative representing another 
1220 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  67 
privilege applies if the communications were for professional 
legal services. 
Two states apply particularly unique privileges: Indiana 
and Maryland. In Indiana, attorneys are not required to 
testify about confidential communications made to them in 
their professional capacity.39 Maryland’s attorney-client 
privilege is written similarly, but it is not limited to 
attorneys.40 Some states,41 like Rhode Island,42 follow the 
Federal Rules of Evidence’s lead on applying common law.43 
The Supreme Court has heard only a handful of cases on 
attorney-client privilege.44 Only two are relevant to this 
 
party of common interest, (4) representatives of the client, and (5) attorneys 
representing the same client. The only, slight difference between states adopting 
attorney-client privileges similar to Alabama is the inclusion or exclusion of 
“representatives” as those who are included in the privilege. Compare ALA. R. 
EVID. 502 with NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 49.035–49.115 (West 1971). 
Representatives are usually defined as someone with authority to obtain legal 
services or act on legal advice on behalf of the client or a person who makes or 
receives a confidential communication while working for the client. See, e.g., ALA. 
R. EVID. 502. This inclusive application does not stop at the widely adopted 
Alabama rule. It is also used in states like Colorado, who apply the attorney-
client privilege to secretaries, clerks, and paralegals. See COLO. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 13-90-107(1)(b) (West 2017). Including representatives extends liability 
to law firms and corporations for disclosing confidential client communication. 
 39. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-46-3-1(1) (West 1998). This implies that attorneys 
may choose to testify about confidential communications. 
 40. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-108 (West 1973). Maryland’s 
privilege states, “A person may not be compelled to testify in violation of the 
attorney-client privilege.” This implies everyone involved in the representation, 
like secretaries, assistants, and clerks. 
 41. MI RULES MRE 501; SC R. REV. Rule 501; VA. R. PROF. COND. 1-6 (2016); 
W. VA. R. EVID. 501. 
 42. R.I. R. EVID. 501. 
 43. FED. R. EVID. 501. Federal Rule of Evidence 501 states the common law 
rules privilege, including the attorney-client privilege. 
 44. See generally United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162 
(2011); Mohawk Indust., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100 (2009); Swidler & Berlin 
v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 410 (1998); United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554 
(1989); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343 (1985); 
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 397 (1981); Fisher v. United States, 
425 U.S. 391 (1976); Tierney v. United States, 409 U.S. 1232 (1972). These laws 
that boot determining privilege requirements to the judiciary could be 
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article,45 Swidler & Berlin v. United States and Upjohn Co. 
v. United States.46 In Swidler, the Court decided that the 
attorney-client privilege applies after death.47 In Upjohn, the 
Court decided that the attorney-client privilege applies in 
the corporate setting to workers communicating to corporate 
attorneys.48 
III. CRIME-FRAUD EXCEPTION TO THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT 
PRIVILEGE 
In its most basic form, the crime-fraud exception to the 
attorney-client privilege prevents clients from obtaining 
advice from a lawyer to commit a crime or fraud.49 The crime-
fraud exception exists to protect the professional relationship 
between lawyer and client because if a client tries to obtain 
advice to commit a crime or fraud, the attorney’s work is 
contrary to the system established to help citizens navigate 
 
problematic. The common law can be inconsistent among courts, even within the 
same system. For example, a court in the Ninth Judicial Circuit of Illinois may 
apply a previous Illinois Supreme Court decision more liberally than a court in 
the Tenth Judicial Circuit of Illinois. This inconsistent legal decision-making 
makes the law unfair, with different decisions based on where a case happens to 
be within the state. The other states with statutory guidelines provide a basis for 
the common law to build upon. The law helps maintain a universal boundary on 
all courts within the state. 
 45. These Supreme Court cases are focused on because of their binding 
applicability to all courts across the nation. While federal and state cases are 
interesting and informative, they only bind their jurisdiction, thus applicability 
is limited. 
 46. Swidler, 524 U.S. 399 (1998); Upjohn, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). 
 47. Swidler, 524 U.S. at 410.  
 48. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 397. The current test from Upjohn applies the 
attorney-client privilege to communication (1) at the direction of a superior (2) to 
a corporate attorney (3) regarding a matter within the scope of employment. The 
communication must be made with the intent to assist a corporate attorney in: 
evaluating whether the employee’s conduct would bind the corporation, assessing 
the legal consequences of the employee’s conduct, or formulating a legal response 
to the employee’s conduct. 
 49. PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN, FEDERAL TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES § 2:36, Westlaw 
(database updated Nov. 2018).  
1222 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  67 
the legal system.50 As the Sixth Circuit stated in In re 
Antitrust Grand Jury, “all reasons for the attorney-client 
privilege are completely eviscerated when a client consults 
an attorney not for advice on past misconduct, but for legal 
assistance in carrying out a contemplated or ongoing crime 
or fraud.”51 
The rules surrounding the crime-fraud exception reflect 
this pro-legal system policy. For example, the court examines 
the client’s intent in obtaining legal services, rather than the 
attorney’s intent in giving the advice.52 “The privilege is not 
lost if the client innocently proposed an illegal course of 
conduct to explore with his counsel what he may or may not 
do. Only when a client knowingly seeks legal counsel to 
further a continuing or future crime does the crime-fraud 
exception apply.”53 
In addition to the attorney-client privilege, Figure One 
includes the various crime-fraud exceptions to the attorney-
client privilege, as adopted by states through statutes and 
court rules.54 The most common crime-fraud exception is the 
one adopted by Alaska.55 
Ohio and Puerto Rico have the most expansive crime-
fraud exceptions.56 In Ohio, the crime-fraud exception 
 
 50. Attorney-Client Privilege in the United States, supra note 13, at § 8:2. 
 51. In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805 F.2d 155, 162 (6th Cir. 1986).  
 52. Attorney-Client Privilege in the United States, supra note 13, at § 8:5. 
 53. Id. (quoting United States v. Doe, 429 F.3d 450 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 54. See infra app. Fig. One.  
 55. ALASKA R. EVID. 503. Alaska is referenced simply because it is one of the 
first entries in the appendix figure. It is not indicative of time or importance. 
Alaska’s crime-fraud exception states that information sought, obtained, or used 
by the client to enable anyone to commit or plan a crime or fraud negates the 
attorney-client privilege. The client needs to have known or should have known 
that the person’s actions were a crime or fraud. Interestingly, this crime-fraud 
exception is not limited to the client’s actions. It encompasses the actions of 
anyone the client assists with the information, meaning that this waives the 
client’s attorney-client privilege when he or she is an accomplice or co-
conspirator. 
 56. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 32 Ap. IV, § 25(c)(1); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. 
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includes actions in “bad faith” as a waiver to the attorney-
client privilege.57 This is the broadest statutory 
interpretation of the crime-fraud exception.58 The second 
most broad is Puerto Rico, which includes seeking advice to 
enable or aid anyone to commit a crime, tortious act, or 
fraud.59 
California has the most unique, topic-specific crime-
fraud exception.60 There is a clarification clause on cannabis 
because recreational marijuana use is legal within the 
state.61 California specifies that the crime-fraud exception 
does not apply to confidential communications on medical 
cannabis or adult-use cannabis so long as the lawyer advises 
the client on federal law conflicts.62 
 
§ 2317.02(A) (West 2017). While Puerto Rico is not a state in the United States, 
it is a jurisdiction within the federal system. Therefore, it is included in the 
analysis.  
 57. OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2317.02(A) (West 2017). Black’s Law Dictionary 
defines “bad faith” as “dishonesty of belief, purpose, or motive.” Bad Faith, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). This crime-fraud exception includes 
more conduct than what is proposed in this paper.  
 58. E.g., compare OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2317.02(A) (West 2017), with 
ALASKA R. EVID. 503.  
 59. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 32 Ap. IV, § 25(c)(1). This crime-fraud exception 
includes more conduct than what is proposed in this paper, as it includes all 
tortious conduct, not just intentional torts. However, this is the closest to the 
proposed crime-fraud-tort exception. Id. 
 60. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 956 (West 2018). 
 61. Theresa Waldrop, Californians line up to legally buy recreational pot, 
CNN (Jan. 2, 2018, 6:23 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2018/01/01/us/california-
marijuana-sales/index.html. 
 62. Almost every state has legalized some type of marijuana use and more 
states are considering jumping on the bandwagon this year. Linley Sanders, 
Marijuana Legalization 2018: Which States Might Consider Cannabis Laws This 
Year?, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 2, 2018, 8:00 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/marijuana-
legalization-2018-which-states-will-consider-cannabis-laws-year-755282. 
However, while states legalized marijuana, it is still illegal on the federal level. 
21 U.S.C.A. § 841 (2010). With the conflicting federal and state laws on 
marijuana, more states may pass similar amendments to their crime-fraud 
exceptions, like California, in order to protect their citizens from attorney 
disclosure of confidential communications. If they do not pass such amendments, 
attorneys may be forced to testify about communications that the client thought 
would remain confidential. He or she may not realize they are committing a crime 
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There are many states without statutory crime-fraud 
exceptions.63 Assumptively, these states follow the same 
path as the Federal Rules of Evidence, leaving the crime-
fraud exception solely to common law. Some states, like 
Connecticut, do not specify the crime-fraud exception in the 
statute itself, but provide guidance in research references.64 
The common law builds upon these statutory rules, like 
the attorney-client privilege itself. While the rules provide a 
baseline, the application of each state’s crime-fraud 
exception may vary by court and government level. Common 
law precedent plays an important role in shaping the crime-
fraud exception by building onto the state statutes. The 
timing of the client’s criminal or fraudulent intention affects 
crime-fraud exception application.65 Regardless of 
impossibility, the crime or fraud generally needs not to have 
occurred for the crime-fraud exception to apply.66 However, 
in In re Sealed Case, the D.C. Circuit held that for the crime-
fraud exception to apply, the proponent of the exception must 
establish that the client carried out the crime or fraud, 
otherwise, the court reasoned, it would deter the very 
purpose of the attorney-client privilege—achieving legal 
 
because of the state law legalizing marijuana. 
 63. Twenty-three states do not have statutory crime-fraud exceptions, 
including New York. 
 64. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-84 (West 1982) (Research Refs.); see also MD 
CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC., § 9-108 (West 1973). 
 65. Attorney-Client Privilege in the United States, supra note 13, at § 8:2. For 
example, if a client legitimately enters into an attorney-client relationship for 
legitimate legal services, then intentionally uses the lawyer for illegal or 
fraudulent purposes, courts disregard the crime-fraud exception. Instead, they 
examine the action as a waiver. However, if the client comes to the lawyer for 
illegal and legitimate legal services combined, the court applies the crime-fraud 
exception. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 445 F.3d 226 (3d Cir. 2006). 
Additionally, if the crime or fraud was not committed because of an intervening 
factor, the crime-fraud exception still applies. Impossibility does not negate the 
intention of the individual. However, the intervening factor application is 
complicated if impossibility is a defense to the criminal charge. The crime-fraud 
exception would not apply, as there is no case against the individual who sought 
the advice.  
 66. Id. 
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compliance through legal advice.67 
At the federal level, some circuits require a prima-facie 
showing of a violation of the attorney-client privilege 
violation.68 The burden is on the government to show that 
the communication falls outside the attorney-client 
privilege.69 
To overcome an established privilege using the crime-fraud 
exception, the government must show that the communications (i) 
were made for an unlawful purpose or to further an illegal scheme 
and (ii) reflect an ongoing or future unlawful or illegal scheme or 
activity. Importantly, the purported crime or fraud need not be 
proved either by a preponderance or beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Rather, the proof “must be such as to subject the opposing party to 
the risk of non-persuasion of the evidence as to the disputed fact is 
left unrebutted.”70 
To meet this prima-facie burden, the government may 
use inadmissible evidence, such as hearsay, so long as it has 
been lawfully obtained and is not otherwise privileged.71 
Parties may also use the attorney-client communications 
at issue to meet the crime-fraud exception’s prima-facie 
burden, which utilizes in camera review.72 In United States 
v. Zolin, the IRS requested tapes and other evidence from a 
county clerk in order to aid a current investigation.73 The 
tapes were from a previous case, Church of Scientology of 
California v. Armstong.74 When the IRS requested the tapes, 
members of the Church of Scientology filed a temporary 
 
 67. Id. This precedent is still good law. 
 68. In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805 F.2d 155, 165 (6th Cir. 1986) (citing In re 
Grand Jury Proceedings, 731 F.2d, 1032, 1039 (2d Cir. 1984); In re Int’l Sys. & 
Controls Corp., 693 F.2d 1235, 1242 (5th Cir. 1982)). 
 69. United States v. Lentz, 419 F. Supp. 2d 820, 831 (E.D. Va. 2005).  
 70. Id. (citing Union Camp Corp. v. Lewis, 385 F.2d 143, 144–45 (4th Cir. 
1967)).  
 71. Id.  
 72. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 565 (1989). 
 73. Id. at 557. 
 74. Id. 
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restraining order preventing the tapes from being turned 
over to the IRS.75 The IRS filed a petition in federal district 
court in order to enforce the summons, but the court refused 
to enforce it, reasoning that the tapes contained confidential 
attorney-client matters and that the crime-fraud exception 
did not apply.76 The IRS appealed, claiming that the district 
court erred in denying the IRS’s request for in camera 
review77 of the tapes to determine if the crime-fraud 
exception applied.78 
On appeal, the Supreme Court decided that the Federal 
Rule of Evidence allows in camera review to determine 
whether the crime-fraud exception would apply.79 However, 
before in camera review, the party asserting the crime-fraud 
exception must show there is a “‘[f]actual basis adequate to 
support a good faith belief by reasonable person’ that in 
camera review of the materials may reveal evidence to 
establish the claim that the crime-fraud exception applies.”80 
In other words, the government must present evidence, in 
addition to the communications, for the court to even 
consider if the crime-fraud exception applies.81 
Burdens of proof vary slightly across circuits. For 
example, as stated above, the D.C. Circuit requires the 
 
 75. Id. at 557–58. 
 76. Id. at 558–59. 
 77. In camera review is when the court views potential evidence privately to 
determine its admissibility. See In Camera Inspection Law and Legal Definition, 
USLEGAL, https://definitions.uslegal.com/i/in-camera/ (Last visited Jun. 19, 
2019). 
 78. Zolin, 491 U.S. at 560. 
 79. Id. at 568 (“[w]e shall not interpret Rule 104(a) as categorically 
prohibiting the party opposing the privilege to crime-fraud grounds from relying 
on the results of an in camera review of the communications.”). 
 80. Id. at 572 (quoting Caldwell v. District Court, 644 P.2d 26, 33 (Colo. 
1982)). 
 81. This is like requiring corroborative evidence. Therefore, while there is not 
a burden of proof for the crime fraud-exception to apply, see Attorney-Client 
Privilege in the United States, supra note 13, at § 8:2, there is a heavy 
requirement. 
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defendant to have committed the crime or fraud.82 However, 
within the Second and Fourth Circuit “it is simply 
immaterial whether the defendant actually succeeded in 
completing the crime or fraud in question; rather, solicitation 
[of the attorney] alone triggers the exception.”83 The slight 
differences in the crime-fraud exception application only 
exist in the second part of the rule, stated below and thus the 
rule generally remains unchanged for in camera review. 
Based on Zolin, the rule for determining if a court may 
apply the crime-fraud exception is as follows: the party 
asserting the crime-fraud exception may present evidence 
based on a reasonable belief that in camera review of the 
communications may provide enough evidence to apply the 
crime-fraud exception. The evidence presented must be 
relevant, lawfully obtained, and non-privileged.84 If that 
burden is met, then the circuit-specific crime-fraud exception 
rules apply to determine if there is an actual crime-fraud 
exception. 
An extension of the attorney-client privilege, the work 
product doctrine, is often discussed in crime-fraud exception 
cases. The work product doctrine originated in a 1947 
Supreme Court case, Hickman v. Taylor and stands for the 
proposition that an attorney’s physical work on a case, like 
notes, is generally undiscoverable.85 For the crime-fraud 
 
 82. Attorney-Client Privilege in the United States, supra note 13, at § 8:2 
(citing In re Sealed Case, 107 F.3d 46, 49 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).  
 83. Lentz, 419 F. Supp. 2d at 830 (citing In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces 
Tecum, 731 F.2d 1032, 1039 (2d Cir. 1984)). 
 84. See Zolin, 491 U.S. at 574–75. 
 85. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). In Hickman, after a tugboat 
crash, the tugboat owners’ attorney interviewed witnesses. Id. at 498–99. In an 
interrogatory, the opposing party requested the witness names and statements, 
but the tugboat owners’ attorney refused to turn over his documentation on the 
witnesses’ statements. Id. The Court ruled that the attorney could not be forced 
to turn over the statements with his personal notes because of the attorney’s duty 
to “work for the advancement of justice, while faithfully protecting the rightful 
interest of his clients.” Id. at 510. However, the Court noted the rule that an 
attorney’s work is free from discovery is not absolute. Id. at 511–12. Courts could 
make an exception “[w]here relevant and non-privileged facts remain hidden in 
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exception, the work product doctrine does not protect the 
work completed by the lawyer, as the information was to 
further a crime or fraud.86 Like the crime-fraud exception 
applies to conversations, it applies to writing. 
IV. EXTENSION OF THE CRIME-FRAUD EXCEPTION TO 
INTENTIONAL TORTS 
Some courts have embraced expanding the crime-fraud 
exception to intentional torts. As their name implies, 
intentional torts require an intentional act by the 
defendant.87 Intentional torts are similar to crimes, but exist 
in civil rather than criminal law. They are more serious than 
negligent torts, due to increased culpability.88 “Intentional” 
means that “[a]n actor . . . brings about harm either 
purposefully or knowingly”;89 the intention is not in the 
harm, but in doing the activity.90 This requirement affects 
 
an attorney’s file and where production of those facts is essential to the 
preparation of one’s case.” Id. at 511. The rule and exception laid the foundation 
of the work product doctrine, encompassed in Rule Twenty-Six of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. See G. Michael Halfenger, The Attorney Misconduct 
Exception to the Work Product Doctrine, 58 U. OF CHI L. R. 1079, 1080 (1991). 
 86. See In re Grand Jury Matter #3, 847 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2017); Tri-State 
Hosp. Supply Corp. v. United States, 238 F.R.D. 102, 104 (D.D.C. 2006) (citing In 
re Sealed Case, 107 F.3d 46, 51 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). 
 87. Beyond showing intention, each intentional tort has different elements. 
See Intentional Tort, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/ 
intentional_tort (last visited Mar. 20, 2018). For example, to prove intentional 
infliction of emotional distress in New York, the plaintiff must prove “(1) extreme 
and outrageous conduct, (2) intent to cause severe emotional distress, (3) a causal 
connection between the conduct and injury, and (4) severe emotional distress.” 
Dorn v. Maffei, 386 F. Supp. 2d 479, 486 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). However, to prove 
slander, the plaintiff must prove (1) there was a defamatory statement, (2) 
published to a third party, (3) concerning the plaintiff, (4) with the applicable 
level of fault (intentional), (5) causing special harm or constituting slander per 
se, (6) not protected by privilege. Albert v. Loksen, 239 F.3d 256, 265–66 (2d Cir. 
2001). 
 88. See Intentional Tort, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/ 
wex/intentional_tort (last visited Mar. 20, 2018).  
 89. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: GEN. PRINCIPLES § 1 DD (AM. LAW INST. 
1999). 
 90. Intentional Torts, LEGAL DICTIONARY https://legaldictionary.net/ 
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the proof needed to be fulfilled to bring the claim.91 The 
definition of intention is different from “negligence,” which 
means “the failure to exercise the standard of care that a 
reasonably prudent person would have exercised in a similar 
situation.”92 Negligence does not include intentional, 
wanton, or willful conduct.93 
Some courts embrace intentional torts as part of the 
crime-fraud exception, while others reject it. 
A. Acceptance of and Arguments for the Crime-Fraud-Tort 
Exception 
While the original meaning of the crime-fraud exception 
includes crimes and frauds, an increasing number of courts 
now apply the crime-fraud exception to intentional torts. In 
1950, the idea of the crime-fraud exception applying to torts 
was first discussed, in dictum, in United States v. United 
Shoe Machinery Corp.94 From United Shoe, the idea of 
 
intentional-tort/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2018). 
 91. The best example of this is a car accident. In example one, Donna is 
driving down the road and pulls up to an intersection. At the intersection, she 
believes she has the green light; Donna actually has the red light. She drives into 
the intersection and collides with Vanessa. Vanessa is injured by the impact. This 
is an example of a negligent tort. In example two, Donna is driving down the road 
and pulls up to an intersection. At the intersection, she sees Vanessa, whom she 
despises because last week Vanessa stole her wallet. Donna decides she is going 
to stop Vanessa to get her wallet back, so she drives into Vanessa’s car. Vanessa 
is injured by the impact. This is an example of an intentional tort. Donna’s 
intention to hit Vanessa’s car is relevant; her lack of intent to injure Vanessa is 
irrelevant. 
 92. Negligence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  
 93. Id.  
 94. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358–59 (D. 
Mass. 1950). United Shoe involved an anti-trust action, where counsel opposed 
the introduction of hundreds of exhibits on the basis that the corporations and 
their officers consulted counsel to commit a crime or tort. See id. The court 
decided this assertion was unfounded, but included torts in their crime-fraud 
analysis. This analysis created a rule: “(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is 
or sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made 
(a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with 
this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact 
of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of 
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applying the crime-fraud exception to torts popped up in 
courts around the nation.95 
After Congress adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence,96 
more courts applied the crime-fraud exception to tortious 
conduct.97 In United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., the 
District Court for the District of Columbia decided that the 
exception has been applied to crimes; crimes and fraud; and 
crimes, fraud, and torts.98 However, it did not matter which 
definition was used in the case, as the violation of the 
Sherman Antitrust Act encompassed all three, a crime, 
fraud, and tort.99 In Diamond v. Stratton, the Southern 
District of New York applied the crime-fraud exception to 
intentional infliction of emotional distress.100 The court 
supported their decision by quoting Professor Wigmore: 
To deny the protection of the privilege to communications in aid of 
fraud while granting it to communications in aid of another 
intentional tort would draw a too “crude boundary”, as 
characterized by Wigmore, who also questions “how the law can 
protect a deliberate plan to defy the law and oust another person of 
 
strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or 
(ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the 
purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed 
and (b) not waived by the client.” Id. 
 95. See, e.g.,  Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1172 
(D. S.C. 1974) (“The attorney-client privilege was not meant to protect such 
communications intended to foster criminal, fraudulent, or tortious conduct.”), 
aff’d 540 F.2d 1215, 1217 (4th Cir. 1976); In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings 
in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 4-71 Civ. 435, 1971 WL 601 at *4 (D. Minn. Oct. 
1, 1971) (“There is no attorney-client privilege if the services of the lawyer were 
sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit what the 
client knew or reasonably should have known to be a crime, tort, or fraud.”). 
 96. FED. R. EVID., Historical Note, supra note 22. 
 97. See 24 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Evid. § 5501 n.207 (last updated Apr. 2019) 
(listing various attorney-client cases involving intentional torts). 
 98. United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 86 F.R.D. 603, 624 (D.D.C. 1979) 
(“The law of attorney-client privilege has long recognized an exception. . . . [t]he 
prohibited purpose that triggers the unveiling has been described as a ‘crime,’ 
‘crime or fraud,’ and ‘crime, fraud, or tort.’”). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Diamond v. Stratton, 95 F.R.D. 503, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
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his rights, whatever the precise nature of those rights may be.”101 
Then, in 1983 in Irving Trust Co. v. Gomez, the Southern 
District decided communications in furtherance of the 
“tortious conduct” of a credit scam were not protected by the 
attorney-client privilege.102 
In 1985, the Supreme Court acknowledged a 
respondent’s argument pertaining to the exception to the 
attorney client privilege.103 However, the Court did not 
discuss the “ordinary torts” language, and took up the issue 
based on fraud instead.104 The same year, the D.C. Circuit 
decided spoliation of evidence, a misconduct other than a 
crime or fraud, could be applied to the crime-fraud 
exception.105 The court stated, “Communications otherwise 
protected by the attorney-client privilege are not protected if 
the communications are made in furtherance of a crime, 
fraud, or other misconduct.”106 In 1997, the D.C. District 
followed the Circuit’s lead in Recycling Solutions, Inc. v. 
District of Columbia, deciding that “other misconduct” in In 
re Sealed Case applied to the furtherance of racial or ethnic 
discrimination.107 However, they also noted that the rest of 
the country had not completely caught up the D.C. Circuit 
 
 101. Id. (quoting 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2298, at 577 (McNaughton rev. 
1961)). 
 102. Irving Trust Co. v. Gomez, 100 F.R.D. 273, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
 103. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 354 
(1985) (“They point out that the privilege does not shield the disclosure of 
communications relating to the planning or commission of ongoing fraud, crimes, 
and ordinary torts.”). Commodity involved a debtor’s trustee attempting to waive 
a corporation’s attorney-client privilege in a bankruptcy matter. Id. at 345. 
 104. Id. at 354 (deciding that the respondents did not make the threshold 
showing of fraud to apply the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client 
privilege). 
 105. See In re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d 395, 399–400 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
 106. Id. at 399 (emphasis added) (citing Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 14 
(1933)); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 731 F.2d 1032, 1038 (2d Cir. 
1984); In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 812 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). 
 107. Recycling Sols., Inc. v. District of Columbia, 175 F.R.D. 407, 409 (D.D.C. 
1997). 
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precedent.108 
The expansion of the crime-fraud exception continued 
into the millennium. In Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 
a spoliation case, the Eastern District of Virginia stated, 
“The term ‘crime/fraud exception,’ however, is a ‘bit of a 
misnomer,’ . . . as many courts have applied the exception to 
situations falling well outside of the definitions of crime or 
fraud.”109 Then, in Safety Today, Inc. v. Roy the Southern 
District of Ohio determined that the crime-fraud exception 
would apply to tortious interference with a contract.110 The 
court concluded: 
Ohio courts have, and will continue to, analyze wrongful conduct 
not strictly falling into the category of either crimes or frauds on a 
case-by-case basis to determine if the conduct involves similar 
elements of malicious or injurious intent and deliberate falsehood. 
If it does, there is no reason why the law should prevent disclosure 
of the role an attorney may have played in assisting his or her client 
to commit that type of act, which itself has no social value.111 
In addition to support from the cases above, intentional 
torts as part of the crime-fraud exception would positively 
impact legal social policy, as intentional torts serve no 
purpose to society, like crime.112 By including intentional 
torts in the crime-fraud-tort exception, clients will be unable 
to use attorneys to perpetuate socially unacceptable 
activities, such as sexual harassment and defamation, as 
their attorney could disclose discussions about such 
activities. 
While “sexual harassment” can include crimes, some 
parts of sexual harassment consist of tortious conduct, like 
intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation. 
 
 108. Id. 
 109. Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 222 F.R.D. 280, 288 (E.D. Va. 2004) 
(quoting Blanchard v. EdgeMark Fin. Corp., 192 F.R.D. 233, 241 (N.D. Ill. 2000)). 
 110. Safety Today, Inc. v. Roy, No. 2:12-cv-510, 2013 WL 5597065, *6 (S.D. 
Ohio 2013). 
 111. Id. at *5.  
 112. Diamond v. Stratton, 95 F.R.D. 503, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
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For suits regarding sexual harassment, the crime-fraud-tort 
exception can step in to determine if certain organizations 
covered up alleged misconduct. An example of this is the 
USA Gymnastics case involving Larry Nassar.113 Aly 
Raisman, a former decorated Olympian, brought suit against 
USA Gymnastics for its alleged involvement in covering up 
Nassar’s actions.114 Additionally, McKayla Maroney, another 
former decorated Olympian, claimed that she was paid off by 
USA Gymnastics to keep quiet on Nassar’s actions, meaning 
that USA Gymnastics knew about Nassar’s actions prior to 
his criminal case.115 If Nassar consulted a USA gymnastics 
 
 113. Jen Kirby, The sex abuse scandal surrounding USA Gymnastics team 
doctor Larry Nassar, explained, VOX (May 16, 2018, 4:45 PM), https://www.vox 
.com/identities/2018/1/19/16897722/sexual-abuse-usa-gymnastics-larry-nassar-
explained; see generally Larry Nassar sex abuse scandal, BBC NEWS (Apr. 26, 
2019 at 2:50 PM), https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/clwx28lpp90t/larry-nassar-
sex-abuse-scandal. 
 114. Christine Brennan, Ally Raisman’s lawsuit against U.S. Olympics 
Committee, USA Gymnastics to serve as silver lining, USA TODAY (Mar. 2, 2018, 
5:51 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/columnist/brennan/2018/03/02/ 
aly-raismans-lawsuit-against-u-s-olympic-committee-usa-gymnastics-serve-
silver-lining/390825002/; Darren Reynolds, Aly Raisman files lawsuit against 
USOC, USA Gymnastics over handling of Larry Nassar, ABC NEWS (Mar. 2, 
2018, 11:15 AM) https://abcnews.go.com/US/aly-raisman-files-lawsuit-usoc-usa-
gymnastics-handling/story?id=53453469; See also Eddie Pells, 51 Women are 
Suing the U.S. Olympic Committee for Failing to Prevent Abuse By Larry Nassar, 
PBS (Mar. 15, 2019, 5:12 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/51-women-
sue-u-s-olympic-committee-for-failing-to-stop-nassar-abuse. Importantly, 
Michigan needed to extend the statute of limitations for these suits against 
Nassar. Jay Tokasz, What you need to know about New York’s Child Victims Act, 
BUFFALO NEWS (Feb. 8, 2019), https://buffalonews.com/2019/02/08/ new-york-
state-child-victims-act-frequently-asked-questions/. Other states have similarly 
extended the statute of limitations for sexual assault and harassment cases. Id. 
Most recently, New York passed the Child Victims Act, with the focus on priest 
sexual abuse. Elizabeth Joseph, ‘This is society’s way of saying we are sorry,’ New 
York Governor tells survivors of sex abuse before signing Child Victims Act into 
law, CNN (Feb. 14, 2019, 4:59 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/14/us/new-
york-child-victims-act-signed/index.html. The analysis for Nassar could easily 
apply to the Catholic Church’s alleged cover-ups. See Pennsylvania grand jury 
finds some police and district attorneys helped Catholic church cover up priest 
abuse, THE MORNING CALL (Sept. 1, 2018), 
https://www.mcall.com/news/pennsylvania/mc-nws-grand-jury-law-enforcement-
priests-20180823-story.html, 
 115. Richard Winton et al., McKayla Maroney accuses USOC and USA 
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lawyer about how to get around the law and continue his 
sexual crimes and torts, the conversations would be 
discoverable in the civil case if a crime-fraud-tort exception 
were implemented.116 This would make it easier to prove 
Nassar’s guilt and could show that USA Gymnastics is liable 
for helping Nassar perpetuate his inappropriate sexual 
behavior.117 
In the age of social media, defamation is a common 
occurrence.118 A crime-fraud-tort exception could have an 
impact on these suits, especially against major corporations, 
like news outlets, or political actors, as they have attorneys 
on call to consult before acting. If the defamer consulted an 
attorney, the conversations could be discoverable, making it 
easier to prove defamation. 
The prior case law since the 1950s and the lack of social 
value of intentional torts, similar to crimes, demonstrates 
 
Gymnastics of covering up sexual abuse with secret settlement, L.A. TIMES 
(Dec. 21, 2017, 12:05 PM) http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-maroney-
gynnastics-settlement-20171220-story.html; see also Tracy Connor & Sarah 
Fitzpatrick, Gymnastics scandal: 8 times Larry Nassar could have been stopped, 
NBC News (Jan. 28, 2018, 8:34 PM) (explaining how Nassar could have been 
stopped sooner within USA Gymnastics and Michigan State University) 
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/gymnastics-scandal-8-times-larry-
nassar-could-have-been-stopped-n841091. 
 116. Important to remember however, is the Upjohn requirement for 
businesses. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 397 (1981). Nassar’s 
conversations may not be protected anyway if he was not told to consult the 
lawyer by his superior or the conversation was not to figure out the legal 
implications and response by USA Gymnastics. See id. at 394. 
 117. This can also apply to other situations in the Me Too Movement. See 
generally Christen A. Johnson & KT Hawbaker, #MeToo: A timeline of events, 
CHI. TRIBUNE (May 19, 2019, 2:10 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/ 
lifestyles/ct-me-too-timeline-20171208-htmlstory.html. 
 118. See, e.g., Luke Barr, Trump wants to get to the ‘bottom of’ alleged anti-
conservative bias on social media, ABC NEWS (Mar. 20, 2019 6:00 AM), 
https://6abc.com/trump-wants-to-get-to-the-bottom-of-alleged-anti-conservative-
bias-on-social-media/5207595/; Michelle Kaminsky, As Infowars’ Alex Jones 
Fights Defamation Lawsuits, Let’s Talk Media Literacy Programs, FORBES (Aug. 
1, 2018, 5:40 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/michellefabio/2018/08/01/as-
infowars-alex-jones-fights-defamation-lawsuits-lets-talk-media-literacy-
programs/#55f0577b13ad.  
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strong support to include intentional torts in the crime-fraud 
exception. 
B. Resistance of and Arguments Against the Crime-Fraud-
Tort Exception 
While multiple courts have applied the crime-fraud 
exception to intentional torts, some courts have resisted the 
trend.119 Generally, this resistance has developed in two 
forms. Either the court claims it does not have the power to 
extend the crime-fraud exception out to intentional torts,120 
or the court claims that the evidence does not fulfill the 
required showing under the traditional prima-facie 
standard.121 
Coleman v. American Broadcasting Cos. and Martin v. 
American Bankers Life Assur. Co. of Florida demonstrate the 
first form of resistance, the courts’ lack of power.122 In 
Coleman, the court refused to apply the crime-fraud 
exception to a sexual harassment and retaliation 
concealment allegation.123 The court acknowledged that 
courts have expanded the crime-fraud exception, but in 
business related, intentional tort areas.124 However, the 
court reasoned that no court had gone so far as to extend the 
crime-fraud exception to sexual harassment and retaliation, 
and thus it could not do so itself.125 Similarly, in Martin, the 
District Court of the Virgin Islands decided that the crime-
fraud exception did not apply to the furtherance of a bad faith 
insurance claim because the plaintiff did not provide 
 
 119. E.g., Martin v. Am. Bankers Life Assur. Co., 184 F.R.D. 263, 265 (D.V.I. 
1998); Coleman v. Am. Broad. Cos., 106 F.R.D. 201, 209 (D.D.C. 1985). 
 120. E.g., Coleman, 106 F.R.D. at 209. 
 121. E.g., Constand v. Cosby, 232 F.R.D. 494, 500 (E.D. Pa. 2006). 
 122. Martin, 184 F.R.D. at 265; Coleman, 106 F.R.D. at 209. 
 123. See Coleman, 106 F.R.D. at 209. 
 124. Id. at 208. 
 125. See id. at 208–09. 
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precedent that bad faith is a tort.126 The problem was not in 
applying the crime-fraud exception to a tort, but the court’s 
ability to do so within the constraints of common law.127 
Constad v. Cosby demonstrates the second form of 
resistance: failure to fulfill the prima-facie standard.128 In 
Constad, the court decided that there was not a strong 
enough showing that the defendant used their attorney to 
continue the alleged defamation.129 In Constad, the court’s 
reasoning was summed up in a sentence, without any 
guidance on how it decided the alleging party did not fulfill 
the crime-fraud prima-facie showing.130 However, it is 
important to keep in mind that in many crime-fraud 
exception cases, the alleging party generally does not 
successfully make the prima-facie showing.131 
In addition to the above cases, critics may claim that 
including intentional torts in the crime-fraud exception will 
chill clients’ willingness to communicate with their attorney 
about intentional torts they have committed or to seek advice 
to avoid committing.132 While this may chill client 
communication, it will not do so any more than what is 
already chilled by the current crime-fraud exception. 
 
 126. Martin, 184 F.R.D. at 265. 
 127. Id.; see also Ferrara & DiMercurio, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 173 
F.R.D. 7, 13–14 (D. Mass. 1997) (similarly holding that there was no precedent 
to apply the crime-fraud exception to a tort). 
 128. Constand v. Cosby, 232 F.R.D. 494, 500 (E.D. Pa. 2006). 
 129. Id. This decision can be categorized in two ways—as an out from applying 
the crime-fraud exception to an intentional tort or as a true failure to meet the 
required prima-facie showing. 
 130. See id. 
 131. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 773 F.2d 204, 207 
(8th Cir. 1984) (holding that the proof of the crime-fraud exception was “too 
speculative”). 
 132. For a parallel argument supporting adoption of psychotherapist-patient 
privilege, see Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1996) (“If the privilege were 
rejected, confidential conversations between psychotherapists and their patients 
would surely be chilled, particularly when it is obvious that the circumstances 
that give rise to the need for treatment will probably result in litigation.”). 
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Additionally, there is no need to protect communications that 
further intentional torts. If the client is seeking advice to 
avoid committing an intentional tort, like under the current 
crime-fraud exception,133 they do not waive the attorney-
client privilege. The crime-fraud exception seeks to prevent 
socially unacceptable conduct, not to punish those that are 
attempting to comply with the law. 
Critics may also claim that including intentional torts in 
the crime-fraud-intentional tort exception would render the 
Model Professional Rules and state professional rules 
ineffective, as they work hand in hand with the attorney-
client privilege. However, the attorney-client privilege and 
confidentiality vary greatly.134 Confidentiality and privileges 
have their own sources, scope, method of enforcement, and 
exceptions.135 A change in an exception to privilege would not 
inherently affect confidentiality. Additionally, the statutory 
change would be easy—simply adding “intentional tort” to 
each state’s statute. 
V. HOW TO INCLUDE INTENTIONAL TORTS IN THE CRIME-
FRAUD EXCEPTION 
If torts are added to the crime-fraud exception, it should 
only encompass intentional torts, rather than negligent and 
intentional torts, as negligent torts do not involve the 
culpability that intentional torts require.136 If negligent torts 
are included, the exception would encompass acts where the 
actor failed to use proper care.137 Therefore, only intentional 
torts should be included in the crime-fraud-tort exception. 
 
 133. Attorney-Client Privilege in the United States, supra note 13, at § 8:2 
(explaining that the client’s intent must be for an illegal or fraudulent purpose). 
 134. LISA G. LERMAN & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE PRACTICE 
OF LAW 202 (4th ed. 2016).  
 135. Id. 
 136. See Intentional Torts, supra note 90. 
 137. Id. If the actor simply acted carelessly, they did not intend to commit the 
act. If they did not intend it, they could not have sought out advice to commit an 
improper act. 
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This would balance the social policy of confidential attorney-
client communications on one hand, and the other social 
policy of preventing societal wrongs on the other, without 
unfairly including careless acts. 
There are three practical options to add intentional torts 
to the crime-fraud exception: (1) add the crime-fraud-tort 
exception to the Federal Rules of Evidence, (2) let common 
law continue to develop it, or (3) have the Supreme Court 
rule on it. While each route can be used, the Supreme Court 
is the most effective route. 
A. Federal Rules of Evidence 
Option one, adding the exception to the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, is the most unlikely and unhelpful option for many 
reasons. First, neither the attorney-client privilege, nor the 
crime-fraud exception are outlined in the Federal Rules of 
Evidence.138 While Rules 501 and 502 explain aspects of the 
attorney-client privilege, they do not lay out the attorney-
client privilege themselves.139 This would mean that 
Congress would need to add the attorney-client privilege and 
crime-fraud-tort exception. It seems that if Congress took 
this path, it would need to add all the privileges 
acknowledged in federal court. 
Second, it is difficult to believe that Congress would be 
willing to amend the Federal Rules of Evidence so greatly 
because it already decided to avoid incorporating privileges 
when it first adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence.140 Third, 
the Federal Rules already state what to do when confronted 
with an attorney-client privilege problem: refer to common 
law.141 Fourth, Congress does not greatly amend the Federal 
 
 138. See FED. R. EVID. 
 139. See FED. R. EVID. 501, 502; see also Bartholomew, supra note 26, at 1020–
21. 
 140. Bartholomew, supra note 26, at 1020–21. 
 141. Id. 
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Rules of Evidence.142 
However, if Congress decides to amend the Federal 
Rules of Evidence to add a crime-fraud-tort exception, it 
should be as follows: 
503: Attorney-Client Privilege: Crime-Fraud-Tort Exception 
(a) The attorney-client privilege includes any situation 
where: 
(1) legal advice is sought, 
(2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity, 
(3) the communication relating to that purpose, 
(4) made in confidence, 
(5) by the client, 
(6) are at his insistence permanently protected, 
(7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, 
(8) except the protection be waived.143 
(b) The attorney-client privilege applies to all attorney-
client communication, except: 
(1) Crime. Where the client seeks information from the 
professional legal adviser to commit or continue a 
crime. Crimes within state and federal statutes shall 
 
 142. For example, the 2018 amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence 
included only three changes: revising the text of the ancient documents 
exceptions to hearsay in Rule 803 and adding two e-discovery self-authenticating 
requirements to Rule 902. Federal Rules of Evidence Amendments for 2018, 
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE (Aug. 9, 2017), https://www.rulesofevidence.org/ 
federal-rules-of-evidence-amendments-for-2018/. While adding e-discovery is a 
substantial change, incorporating the entire the attorney-client privilege would 
be a larger and more difficult feat. To amend a federal rule of evidence, a 
congresswoman or congressman would need to bring the matter in front of 
Congress. RICHARD S. BETH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20617, HOW BILLS AMEND 
STATUTES (2003), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS20617.pdf. Unfortunately, as the 
crime-fraud exception varies based on jurisdiction, a congressman or 
congresswoman will not likely be flagged as to the inconsistency as it is not an 
intra-jurisdictional issue. 
 143. NICHOLAS, supra note 5, at 291 (citing 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292, at 
554 (McNaughton rev. 1961)) (listing the above elements). 
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apply to this exception. 
(2) Fraud. Where the client seeks information from the 
professional legal adviser to commit or continue a 
fraud. Frauds within state and federal statutes shall 
apply to this exception. 
(3) Tort. Where the client seeks information from the 
professional legal adviser to commit an intentional 
tort. An intentional tort is a harm to another, 
intentionally, rather than negligently, recklessly, or 
knowingly. 
(c) If an exception to the privilege applies, the attorney 
can be compelled to testify regarding the communication 
between herself and her client. 
B. Common Law 
Option two, letting common law continue to develop the 
crime-fraud exception, is practical, but unhelpful. The 
problem with the current crime-fraud exception is 
inconsistency.144 The federal government looks to state law 
to determine the attorney-client privilege, and in this case, 
the crime-fraud exception. However, states are inconsistent 
on the crime-fraud exception.145 States do not have the same 
crime-fraud exception statute requirements, some states do 
not have a crime-fraud exception statute at all, and other 
states leave the crime-fraud exception solely to common 
law.146 While there is a trend in applying the crime-fraud 
exception to intentional torts,147 some courts have refused to 
 
 144. Compare In re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d 395, 399–400 (D.C. Cir. 1985) 
(holding that the crime-fraud exception applies to “other misconduct”) with 
Coleman v. Am. Broad. Cos., 106 F.R.D. 201, 209 (D.D.C. 1985) (holding that the 
crime-fraud exception had not previously been applied to defamation, and 
therefore they could not apply the exception in this case). 
 145. Compare ALA. R. EVID. 502(b) with OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2317.02(A) 
(West 2017). 
 146. See infra app. Fig. One. 
 147. See supra, Part V. 
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do so.148 This system creates inconsistent rulings, all based 
on the physical location of the federal court. If an across the 
board crime-fraud-tort exception is created, without waiting 
on common law to develop it, crime-fraud exception 
application would be more consistent.149 
C. Supreme Court 
Option three, a Supreme Court ruling on the crime-
fraud-tort exception, is the most realistic and useful option 
to create a consistent system. There are many reasons to 
choose this option. First, Congress would not have to battle 
over the terms of an amendment; the Supreme Court can 
issue a decision by a majority of nine, rather than two houses 
of Congress. Second, a case does not have to be developed like 
an amendment; case are organically created. Third, out of 
seven thousand cases appealed to the Supreme Court each 
year,150 there is bound to be a crime-fraud exception case 
within the next few years.151 Fourth, and most importantly, 
 
 148. See supra, Section V.A. 
 149. While many areas of law are inconsistent between jurisdictions, the 
crime-fraud exception should particularly be consistent because of its impact on 
attorneys themselves, not just clients. For example, states differ on marijuana 
legality. Marijuana Overview, NCSL, http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-
criminal-justice/marijuana-overview.aspx (last visited July 6, 2019). This solely 
impacts the client’s liability. However, differing crime-fraud exceptions impact 
what an attorney can consider privileged, not just the client’s liability. 
 150. About the Supreme Court, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts 
.gov/about-federal-courts/educational-resources/about-educational-
outreach/activity-resources/about (last visited Mar. 21, 2018). 
 151. While the Supreme Court has not addressed the attorney-client privilege 
since 2011, United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162 (2011), it has 
regularly decided evidentiary issues. E.g., Turner v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 
1885 (2017); Warger v. Shauers, 135 S. Ct. 521 (2014); Williams v. Illinois, 567 
U.S. 50 (2012). Additionally, the crime-fraud exception has recently become a hot 
topic among lawyers due to the Trump-Cohen relationship controversy. Paul 
Rosenzweig, Michael Cohen, Attorney-Client Privilege and the Crime-Fraud 
Exception, LAWFARE (Apr. 10, 2018, 12:36 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/ 
michael-cohen-attorney-client-privilege-and-crime-fraud-exception; Ugonna Eze, 
The Cohen case and attorney-client privilege, CONSTITUTION CTR. (Apr. 13, 2018), 
https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/the-cohen-case-and-attorney-client-privilege. 
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the Supreme Court already successfully created a uniform 
system around part of the crime-fraud exception in Zolin.152 
In camera review is consistent in both state and federal 
courts because the Supreme Court created guidelines. The 
Court can do the same for the crime-fraud-tort exception 
generally. 
If the Supreme Court were to create guidelines for the 
crime-fraud-tort exception, they should be as follows: 
The crime-fraud exception, as generally adopted by common law, 
currently applies to clients attempting to receive advice from a 
lawyer to assist in continuing, covering up, or committing a crime 
or fraud. Some courts have extended the application to intentional 
torts. To create consistency in common law application, courts 
should apply the crime-fraud exception to situations involving a 
client attempting to receive advice from a lawyer to assist in 
continuing, covering up, or committing an intentional tort. 
For the purposes of judicial application of the crime-
fraud-tort exception, intentional torts should be construed 
narrowly, as to exclude wanton, willful, and reckless 
behavior.153 This behavior includes when “a person acts or 
fails to act, with a conscious realization that injury is a 
probable . . . result of such conduct.”154 Additionally, 
“intentional tortious conduct is when an ordinary, 
reasonable, prudent person would believe an injury was 
substantially certain to result from his conduct.”155 
Intentional conduct requires more than the knowledge and 
appreciation of risk.156 This is not just a “foreseeable risk 
which an ordinary, reasonable, prudent person would avoid,” 
as that would be ordinary negligence.157 Current state and 
 
 152. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554 (1989). 
 153. Melanie L. Carpenter, Petersen v. Sioux Valley Hospital: Reckless 
Infliction of Emotional Distress, 39 S.D. L. REV. 359, 372 (1993).  
 154. Id. at 373 (quoting VerBouwens v. Hamm Wood Prods., 334 N.W.2d 874, 
876 (S.D. 1983)). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
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federal statutes and rules must be made consistent with this 
guideline. 
While application of this guideline may not be perfect, as 
no guideline application ever is, it should provide guidance 
in an area where none has been established by a court higher 
than the district level. A broad standard diminishes the 
ability for circuit splits and will help uphold stare decisis. 
As noted at the end of the guideline, state and federal 
congresses may need to update laws to include torts in the 
crime-fraud-tort exception. This change should not be too 
difficult, as the amendment would only require adding 
“intentional tort” to the list of applicable exceptions. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Given the current political climate and news, and the 
trend toward accepting intentional torts as part of the crime-
fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege, intentional 
torts should officially be included in the crime-fraud 
exception. The attorney-client privilege is a pillar of 
American democracy that should not be tainted by a 
relationship based on intentional torts—a negative aspect of 
society. A crime-fraud-tort exception would increase 
discovery of materials to help fight injustices that should not 
be hidden behind the shield of the attorney-client privilege. 
The sooner the exception is broadened, most easily by the 
Supreme Court, the sooner we increase access to these 
injustice-fighting materials. 
  







(Statute or Court Rule) 
Crime-Fraud 
Exception 
Alabama Client privilege holder: 




services between: (1) 
the client/client’s 
representative and the 
attorney/attorney’s 
representative, (2) the 
attorney and the 
attorney’s 








party of common 
interest, (4) 
representatives of the 
client, and (5) 
attorneys representing 
the same client159 
Information sought 
to commit or plan to 
commit a crime or 
fraud160 
 
 158. Imwinkelried, supra note 17, at app. D (providing the list of state 
attorney-client privilege statutes and court rules). 
 159. ALA. R. EVID. 502(b).  
 160. ALA. R. EVID. 502(d)(1). 
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Alaska See Alabama161 Information sought, 
obtained, or used by 
the client to enable 
anyone to commit or 
plan a crime or 
fraud waives the 
attorney-client 
privilege. This 
applies when the 
client knew or 
should have known 
the action was a 
crime or fraud.162 
Arizona In a civil case, an 
attorney cannot be 
examined regarding 
communication by his 
or her client or the 
attorney’s advice in 











employer’s consent to 
be examined.163 
N/A 
Arkansas See Alabama164 See Alaska165 
California The client has the 
privilege to refuse to 
Lawyer’s services 
sought or obtained 
 
 161. ALASKA R. EVID. 503(b).  
 162. ALASKA R. EVID. 503(d)(1). 
 163. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2234 (1994). 
 164. ARK. R. EVID. 502(b).  
 165. ARK. R. EVID. 502(d)(1). 
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disclose and prevent 






to aid anyone to 
plan or commit a 
crime or fraud; the 




medical cannabis or 
adult-use cannabis 
if the lawyer 
advises the client on 
conflicting federal 
law.167 
Colorado An attorney cannot be 
examined regarding 
communication by his 
or her client or the 
attorney’s advice in 











employer’s consent to 
be examined.168 
N/A 
Connecticut Communications are 
privileged when made 
in confidence between 
a client and an 
attorney for the 
purpose of seeking or 
N/A 
 
 166. CAL. EVID. CODE § 954 (West 1965). 
 167. CAL. EVID. CODE § 956 (West 2018). 
 168. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-90-107(1)(b) (West 2017). 
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giving legal advice.169 
Delaware See Alabama170 See Alaska171 
Dist. Of 
Columbia 
There is no clear 
attorney-client 
privilege, however 
there is a statute 
regarding attorney-
client privilege for the 
government. It 
provides, in part: 
“Nothing in [this law] 
shall limit, waive, or 
abrogate the scope or 
nature of the attorney-
client privilege, . . . 
with respect to 
communications 
between attorneys 
employed by the Office 
of the Attorney 
General and 
subordinate agency 
personnel, or legal 
advice given by Office 
of the Attorney 
General attorneys to 
subordinate agency 
personnel before the 
date of the 
appointment of these 
attorneys to positions 
in the subordinate 
agencies.”172 
N/A 
Florida A client may prevent 
anyone from disclosing 
confidential 
Information sought, 
obtained, or used by 
the client to enable 
 
 169. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 5-2 (West 2017). 
 170. DEL. R. EVID. 502(b).  
 171. DEL. R. EVID. 502(d)(1). 
 172. D.C. CODE § 1-608.66 (2013). 
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information made in 
the course of legal 
services.173 
anyone to commit or 
plan a crime or 
fraud waives the 
attorney-client 
privilege. This 
applies when the 
client knew the 
action was a crime 
or fraud.174 
Georgia Public policy requires 
that communications 
between attorney and 
client are excluded 
from evidence.175 
N/A 
Guam The attorney-client 
privilege exists.176 
N/A 
Hawaii See Alabama177 See Alaska178 
Idaho See Alabama179 See Alaska180 
Illinois Except as provided by 
the U.S. Constitution, 
Illinois Constitution, 
or the Supreme Court 
rules, privileges are 
governed by common 
law, interpreted by 
Illinois courts.181 
N/A 
Indiana Attorneys are not 




 173. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.502(2) (West 2000). 
 174. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.502(4)(a) (West 2000). 
 175. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-5-501 (West 2014). 
 176. GUAM R. EVID. 502. 
 177. HAW. R. EVID. 503(b). 
 178. HAW. R. EVID. 503(d)(1). 
 179. IDAHO R. EVID. 502(b) (repealed 2018). 
 180. IDAHO R. EVID. 502(d)(1). 
 181. ILL. R. EVID. 501 (providing a general rule where Rule 502 reflects Fed. R. 
Evid. 502). 
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communications made 
to them in their 
professional 
capacity.182 








Kansas A client has the 




being disclosed by 
himself, his attorney, 
or any other witness 
who has knowledge of 
the communication.184 
This knowledge comes 
from the attorney-
client communication 
itself, in a manner not 
reasonably anticipated 
by the client, or from a 
breach of the attorney-
client privilege.185 
The communication 
is not privileged if 
the judge finds 
sufficient evidence, 
in addition to the 
communication 
itself, that legal 
services was 
“sought or obtained 
in order to enable or 
aid the commission 
or planning of a 
crime or tort.”186 
Kentucky See Alabama187 See Alaska188 
Louisiana A client has the 
privilege to refuse 
There is no 
privilege if the 
 
 182. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-46-3-1(1) (West 1998). 
 183. IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.10 (West 2015). 
 184. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-426(a) (West 2011). 
 185. Id. 
 186. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-426(b)(1) (West 2011). 
 187. KY. R. EVID. 503(b). 
 188. KY. R. EVID. 503(d)(1). 
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disclosing or allowing 
another to disclose 
confidential 
communication for 
legal services when 
the communication is: 
(1) between the 
client/client’s 
representative and the 
lawyer/lawyer’s 
representative, (2) 
between the lawyer 
and lawyer’s 
representative, (3) by 
the client/lawyer/ 





party, (4) between 
client representatives 
or between the client 
and representative, (5) 
among lawyers and 
representatives 
working for the same 




made in furtherance 
of a crime or 
fraud.190 
Maine See Alabama191 See Alaska192 
Maryland “A person may not be 
compelled to testify in 




 189. LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 506(B) (1993). 
 190. LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 506(C)(1)(b) (1993). 
 191. ME. R. EVID. 502(b).  
 192. ME. R. EVID. 502(d)(1). 
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privilege.”193 
Massachusetts See Alabama194 See Alaska195 
Michigan “Privilege is governed 
by the common law, 
except as modified by 
statute or court 
rule.”196 
N/A 
Minnesota Unless the client 
consents, an attorney 
and the attorney’s 
employee cannot be 
examined on any 
communication from 
the client to the 
attorney or any 
professional advice 
given in response to 
the communication.197 
N/A 
Mississippi See Alabama198 See Alaska199 
Missouri Attorneys, regarding 
their client’s 
communication to 
them or their advice in 
response, are 
incompetent to testify. 
However, the attorney 
may testify if the 
client consents.200 
N/A 
Montana An attorney cannot be N/A 
 
 193. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-108 (West 1973). 
 194. MASS. R. EVID. 502(b). 
 195. MASS. R. EVID. 502(d)(1). 
 196. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. R. EVID. 501 (West 1978). 
 197. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(b) (West 2013). 
 198. MISS. R. EVID. 502(b). 
 199. MISS. R. EVID. 502(d)(1). 
 200. MO. ANN. STAT. § 491.060(3) (West 1977). 
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examined regarding 
communication by his 
or her client or the 
attorney’s advice in 
the course of the 
attorney’s 
employment. A client 
cannot be examined, 
unless he or she 
volunteers.201 
Nebraska See Alabama202 See Alaska203 
Nevada The client has the 
privilege to prevent 
himself or another 





representative and the 
lawyer/lawyer’s 
representative, (2) 
between the client’s 
lawyer/lawyer’s 
representatives, (3) 
made for legal services 
to the client, by the 
client or the lawyer to 
another lawyer 
representing another 
individual in a 
common matter.204 
“There is no 
privilege if the 
services of the 
lawyer were sought 
or obtained to 
enable or aid 
anyone to commit or 
plan to commit 
what the client 
knew or reasonably 
should have known 
to be a crime or 
fraud.”205 
 
 201. MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-803 (West 2009). 
 202. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27-503(2) (West 1975). 
 203. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27-503(4)(a) (West 1975). 
 204. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49.095 (West 1971). 
 205. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49.115(1) (West 1971). 
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New 
Hampshire 







privileged. The client 
has the privilege to 
refuse to disclose it or 
let the 
attorney/witness 
disclose it. The witness 
must have obtained 
knowledge in the 
communication 
between 
attorney/client, in a 
manner not 
reasonably 
anticipated, from a 
breach of the 
lawyer/client 
relationship, or from a 
privileged 
communication 




The privilege does 
not apply to “[a] 
communication in 
the course of legal 
service sought or 
obtained in aid of 
the commission of a 
crime or 
fraud. . . .”209 
New 
Mexico 
See Alabama210 See Alaska211 
New 
York 
An attorney, employee, 
or anyone who obtains 
knowledge about the 
N/A 
 
 206. N.H. R. EVID. 502(b). 
 207. N.H. R. EVID. 502(d)(1). 
 208. N.J. R. EVID. 504(1). 
 209. N.J. R. EVID. 504(2). 
 210. N.M. R. EVID. 11-503(b). 
 211. N.M. R. EVID. 11-503(d)(1). 





the client cannot 
disclose the 
communication in an 
action, trial, or 
hearing. However, 
they may testify if the 




Privileges will be 
determined in 
accordance with the 
law of this State, 
unless otherwise 





See Alabama214 See Alaska215 
Ohio An attorney cannot 
testify about attorney-
client communications 
and the attorney’s 
advice to the client. 
However, the attorney 
may be compelled to 
testify if the client 
voluntarily reveals the 
substance of the 
communication.216 
The communication 
may be subject to in 
camera inspection if 
the party seeking 
disclosure makes a 
prima-facie showing 
of “[b]ad faith, 
fraud, or criminal 
misconduct by the 
client.” This is to 
show the 
communication by 
the client to the 
attorney or by the 
 
 212. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4503(a) (Consol. 2016). 
 213. N.C. R. EVID. 501. 
 214. N.D. R. EVID. 502(b). 
 215. N.D. R. EVID. 502(d)(1). 
 216. OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2317.02(A) (West 2017). 
2019] ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 1255 
attorney to the 
client to aid or 
further 
ongoing/future bad 
faith by the 
client.217 
Oklahoma See Alabama218 See Alaska219 
Oregon See Alabama220 See Alaska221 
Pennsylvania An attorney is not 
permitted to testify 
regarding confidential 
communications made 
to him by his client. 
The client cannot be 
compelled to testify, 










between her and her 
attorney. The privilege 
may be claimed by the 
client, client’s 
authorized privilege 
claimer, and the 
attorney, if claimed in 
the interest of the 
client.223 
“There is no 
privilege under this 
rule if . . . [t]he 
services of the 
attorney were 
sought or obtained 
to enable or aid 
anyone to commit or 
plan to commit a 
crime, tortious act, 
or fraud.”224 
 
 217. Id. 
 218. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2502(B) (West 2013). 
 219. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2502(D)(1) (West 2013). 
 220. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.225(2) (West 2010). 
 221. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.225(4)(a) (West 2010). 
 222. 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5916, 5928 (West 1978). 
 223. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 32, § 25(B). 
 224. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 32, § 25(C)(1). 
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Rhode 
Island 
The privileges in 






governed by the 
common law, as 
interpreted by the 
court in light of reason 
and experience, unless 
otherwise required by 
the South Carolina 
Constitution, U.S. 





See Alabama227 See Alaska228 
Tennessee An attorney cannot, in 
giving testimony 
against a client or 
individual who 
consulted the attorney, 
disclose any suit-
pending 
communication to the 
attorney to the 
individual’s injury.229 
N/A 
Texas See Alabama230 See Alaska231 
Utah A client has the 
privilege to refuse to 
disclose or prevent 
another person from 
See Alaska233 
 
 225. R.I. R. EVID. 501. 
 226. S.C. R. EVID. 501. 
 227. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-19-502(b) (1979). 
 228. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-19-502(d)(1) (1979). 
 229. TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3-105 (West 2009). 
 230. TEX. R. EVID. 503(b). 
 231. TEX. R. EVID. 503(d)(1). 
 233. UTAH R. EVID. 504(d)(1). 
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disclosing confidential 
communications. If the 
communications were 
for professional legal 
services and the 
communications were 






another in a common 
matter, then the 
privilege applies.232 
Vermont See Alabama234 See Alaska235 
Virginia The attorney-client 
privilege is governed 
by common law, 
interpreted by 
Virginia courts in light 
of reason and 
experience, unless 





The common law 
governs privileges.237 
N/A 











 232. UTAH R. EVID. 504(b). 
 234. VT. R. EVID. 502(b). 
 235. VT. R. EVID. 502(d)(1). 
 236. VA. R. EVID. 2:502. 
 237. V.I. R. EVID. 501 (mirroring FED. R. EVID. 501). 
 238. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060 (West 2018). 
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rules by the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of 
West Virginia, or West 
Virginia statutes, 
common law governs 
privilege.239  
Wisconsin See Alabama240 See Alaska241 
Wyoming An attorney cannot 
testify about a 
communication made 
by a client or his 
advice to the client. He 
may testify if the 
client gives consent. 
He may be compelled 






 239. W. VA. R. EVID. 501. 
 240. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 905.03(2) (West 2014). 
 241. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 905.03(4)(a) (West 2014). 
 242. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-12-101(a)(i) (West 1977). 
